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NOTE

APPORTIONMENT IN NORTH DAKOTA: THE SAGA OF
CONTINUING CONTROVERSY

I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of reapportioning the state legislature has
troubled North Dakota for the past eight decades. 1 The longevity of
the problem may be explained, in part, by the array of issues which
must be considered whenever a reapportionment plan is devised. 2
This Note
will examine
the issues
surrounding the
reapportionment controversy, including the basic constitutional
apportionment standards as defined by the United States Supreme
Court. The Note will also discuss the history of apportionment in
North Dakota and will conclude by proposing an alternative to
apportionment by a legislature.
II.

BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL
APPORTIONMENT

PARAMETERS

IN

Apportionment was regarded as a nonjusticiable political

question 3 until 1962 when the United States Supreme Court
1. See Dobson, ReapportionmentProblems, 48 N.D.L. REV. 281 , 283 (1972).
2. .See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade For the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote, " 1969 Sup. CT.
REV. 219 n.4.
3. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (three of seven justices who participated in
the decision agreed that the apportionment issue was nonjusticiable). In Colegrove qualified voters in
Illinois brought an action in federal court to restrain the officers of the state from holding an election.

Id. at 550. The voters alleged that the state's congressional districts lacked compactness of territory
and approximate equality of population. Id. at 551. The United States Supreme Court stated that no
court could "remap" a state's voting districts and that the remedy for unfairness in districting was to
be found in the state legislatures or Congress. Id. at 553-56.
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decided Baker v. Carr.4 The plaintiffs in Baker alleged that the
Tennessee General Assembly's failure to reapportion the state
constituted a debasement of their votes in violation of the equal
protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 5 The Court,
after describing a number of potential political questions, 6 held that
the question of apportionment, although political in nature, was
not necessarily a "political question." 7 The Court held that the
federal district court should not have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction and therefore remanded for a determination of the
equal protection challenge. 8
After allowing courts to decide certain questions involving
democratic representation, the Baker Court left unresolved the
problem of designing a standard for determining what constitutes a
denial of equal protection in legislative apportionment. The United
States Supreme Court's later answer to the problem was the
adoption of the "one man-one vote" doctrine. 9
The first case to apply the "one man-one vote" doctrine to
invalidate a state apportionment plan was Gray v. Sanders.10 In Gray
the plaintiff, a qualified voter, sought to restrain the use of
Georgia's county unit system as a basis for counting votes in a
primary election. I The Court stated that once the geographic unit
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Prior to Baker the Supreme Court decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960), which involved a gerrymandering claim by Black voters in Tuskegee, Alabama. Id.
at 340. The Court agreed that the claim was justiciable, relying on the fifteenth amendment. Id. at

341-43.
5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962). The Tennessee apportionment plan, as adopted
in 1901, resulted in 37 % of the voters electing 20 of the 33 senators and 40% of the voters electing 63
of the 91 members of the house. Id. at 253.
6. Id. at 217. The Court stated that certain types of issues may be nonjusticiable under the
guarantee clause of article IV of the United States Constitution. Id. at 210. The Court described
potential political questions as follows:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each
has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already
made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
7. Id. at 209, 226-27, 237.
8. Id. at 237.
9. The cases establishing and laying the groundwork for the doctrine were Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964),Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963).
10. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
11. Id. at 370. The Georgia apportionment plan at issue in Gray allowed the candiate who won a
plurality of the popular vote in any county in the primary election to take all of the county's electoral
units. The complaint alleged that while one unit vote represented 938 Echols County residents,
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for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, the equal
protection clause requires that every person in the unit have an
equal vote.1 2 Thus, emphasizing the concept of political equality in
the United States, the Court announced the doctrine of "one man13
one vote. "
Shortly after Gray was decided, the United States Supreme
Court applied the "one man-one vote" doctrine to invalidate a
Georgia congressional districting statute. 14 In Wesberry v. Sanders1 5
the plaintiffs, qualified voters, alleged that the statute violated the
federal constitution by depriving them of the right to have their
vote equivalent to the votes of other Georgians. 16 The Court
examined the history of the United States Constitution 17 and held
that article I, section 2, in providing that United States
Representatives be chosen by the people of the several states,
requires that, as nearly as practicable, one man's vote be worth as
much as another's.18
Four months after Wesberry, in its decision of Reynolds v. Sims,
the United States Supreme Court applied the "one man-one vote"
doctrine to state legislative apportionments. 1 9 In Reynolds the
plaintiffs contended that as a result of Alabama's growth between
1900 and 1960, several counties in the state were being
discriminated against with respect to the allocation of legislative
another unit vote represented 92,721 Fulton County residents. Thus, one resident of Echols County
had 99 times the voting power of one resident of Fulton County. Id. at 371.
12. Id. at 379. The Court stated, "The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution
visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications
.... Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once." Id. at 379-80.
13. Id. at 381. "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing - one person, one vote." Id. But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist.,
410 U.S. 719 (1973) (water storage district system in which only landowners could vote for the board
of directors was found to be an exception to Reynolds and not violative of equal protection clause).
14. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Georgia statute, enacted in 1931, created 10
state districts, which designated one United States Representative to a district with a population of
823,680, while also designating one representative to a district with a population of 272,154. Id. at 2.
15. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of article I, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution of
the United States which states in part: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States .
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, S
2, cl. 1.
17. 376 U.S. at 9-18. The Court interpreted the history of the Constitution as follows:
The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: that when
the delegates agreed that the House should represent "people" they intended that in
allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined
solely by the number of the State's inhabitants. The Constitution embodied Edmund
Randolph's proposal for a periodic census to ensure "fair representation of the
people," an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring that "numbers of inhabitants"
should always be the measure of representation in the House of Representatives.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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representation. The Court held that the equal protection clause
and the "one man-one vote" doctrine require that both houses of a
state legislature, as well as the state's congressional districts, be
apportioned on a population basis. 21 The State argued that
membership in one of its houses could be apportioned in the same
manner as the United States Senate where each state, regardless of
population, has two seats. 2 2 The Supreme Court, rejecting this
federal analogy argument, stated that while the original thirteen
23
colonial states were at one time independent, sovereign entities,
the political subdivisions of a state have never been considered
sovereign entities. 24 Therefore, the equal protection clause requires
that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on an equal
25

population basis.
In Reynolds the Supreme Court recognized that state
legislatures need not be apportioned with the same degree of
precision required for congressional districts. 26 If a state can
demonstrate "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation
of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equalpopulation principle are constitutionally permissible. "27
Litigation following Reynolds revolved around districting
questions left unanswered by the Reynolds and Wesberry Courts. One

of these was the uncertainty as to what should be used as the
apportionment base (the population figures upon which the
apportionment is based). Although most states use the United
States Census Bureau count as the apportionment base,2 8 in one
instance the United States Supreme Court has allowed a narrower
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540 (1964). Alabama had not been reapportioned in sixty
years, even though the population had increased from 1,828,697 to 3,244,286. Id. at 542 n.7.
Population variance ratios of 41 to 1 and 16 to 1 existed in the Senate and House of Representatives
respectively. Id. at 545. Population variance ratio is defined as the ratio comparing the population of
two districts, the largest and smallest. See T. O'RouRKE, REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW, POLITICS,

COMPUTERS (1972). In Reynolds the plaintiffs contended that the ratios resulted in the denial of their
"equal suffrage" in free and equal elections in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 377 U.S. at
540.
21. Id. at 575-76.
22. Id. at 571.
23. Id. at 573. A similar analogy was made by the lower federal court in Gray in comparing the
county unit system with the electoral college. 372 U.S. at 376. The United States Supreme Court
rejected the analogy. Id.
24. 377 U.S. at 575.
25. Id. at 575-76. In conclusion the Court stated: "[Tihe Equal Protection clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race." Id. at 566.
26. Id. at 578-79.
27. Id. at 579. The Court stated that the following would be considered as general constitutional*
standards constituting "legitimate considerations:" (1) The maintenance of subdivisions; (2) the
compactness of contiguous territories; and (3) legitimate political subdivisions and natural or
historical boundaries. Id. at 578-79. The Court declared that states are to apportion "as nearly of
equal population as is practicable." Id. at 557. But see Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) (all of
these considerations found by the Supreme Court to be unpersuasive).
28. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Gaffney v Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).

NOTE

451

base. In Burns v. Richardson29 the Court allowed Hawaii to use the
number of registered voters as the base. 30 The Court's holding may
be limited, however, because the districts created by the Hawaii
the districts
Legislature were not substantially different from
31
created in a plan using the traditional census base.
Another problem states faced involved the type of district a
state could implement in an apportionment plan. The state could
use single-member, multimember, 32 or floterial districts. 33 Of the
three types, the validity of multimember districts has been most
frequently questioned under the equal protection clause. The

United States Supreme Court, in addressing the problem of
multimember districts, has stated that multimember districts are
valid as long as the various districts are of substantially equal
a racial or political
population 34 and that the voting strength of 35
element of the voting population is not diluted.
29.-384 U.S. 73(1966).
30. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). The Burns Court explained that apportionment
bases need not be limited to total population figures:
The holding in Reynolds v. Sims, as we characterized it in the other cases decided
on the same day, is that "both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned substantially on a population basis." We start with the proposition that
the Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use total population figures
derived from the federal census as the standard by which this substantial population
equivalency is to be measured. Although total population figures were in fact the basis
of comparison in that case and most of the others decided that day, our discussion
carefully left open the question what population was being referred to. At several
points, we discussed substantial equivalence in terms of voter population or citizen
population, making no distinction between the acceptability of such a test and a test
Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has
based on total population ....
this Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, shortterm or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the
apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed and against which
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured.
Id. at 91-92 (footnotes omitted). See also WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964)
(apportionment based on United States citizenship). But seeDavis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964)
(voting strength of an area cannot be reduced because it contains military personnel).
31. Id. at 93. In using the registered voters base, the state may have to reapportion more often
that every 10 years. Id. at 96.
32. A multimember district is one in which two or more legislators are elected at large by the
voters of one district. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1971).
33. A floterial district is a legislative district that includes within its boundaries several separate
districts or political subdivisions, which independently would not be entitled to an additional
representative, but whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to another seat in the
legislature. See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 n.2 (1964).
34. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). In Reynolds the United States Supreme Court
stated the following: "Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be
substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Id.
35. 384 U.S. at 88. In Burns v. Richardson the Supreme Court held that the equal protection
clause does not require that even one house of a bicameral state legislature consist of single member
election districts. The Court added, however, as follows:
fA]pportionment schemes including multimember districts will constitute an invidious
discrimination only if it can be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multimember
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case,
would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population."
Id. (citing Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
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Although multimember districts are deemed permissible in
certain situations, 36 disenchanted voters have challenged the right
of federal district courts to require the use of multimember districts
in a court-ordered reapportionment plan. 37 The United States

Supreme Court has stated that single-member districts are
generally preferable to multimember districts in a court-ordered
plan. 38
An additional problem encountered in applying the Reynolds
standards to the districting of state legislatures is that of
gerrymandering. 39 The United States Supreme Court has been
reluctant to invalidate reapportionment plans on the grounds of
political gerrymandering; 40 however, racial gerrymandering has
been recognized as being potentially unconstitutional. 4 1 In Wright
v. Rockefeller42 voters challenged New York's congressional
36. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). In Lucas the Court
explained in a footnote:
We do not intimate that apportionment schemes which provide for the at-large
electio.i of a number of legislators from a county, or any political subdivision, are
constitutionally defective. Rather, we merely point out that there are certain aspects of
electing legislators at large from a county as a whole that might well make the adoption
of such a scheme undesirable to many voters residing in multimember counties.
Id. at 731 n.21. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 397 U.S. 433 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the use of
multimember districts was not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 438-39. Under Georgia's
apportionment plan for senatorial districts there were a number of counties that were comprised of
several districts. Instead of electing only one senator from the district in which they resided, the
voters of the county elected, on a county-wide basis, the number of senators equal to the number of
districts in the county. Id. at 435. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (use of
multimember districts in Indiana bicameral legislature not per se illegal; however, state was ordered
to reapportion due to excessive population variations in the Senate (28.20%) and House of
Representatives (24.78%)); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (state's multidistricting plan
struck down in view of history of official racial discrimination relating to right to vote).
37. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971). In Connor interested parties had submitted to the
federal district court four plans that utilized single member districts. The Connor Court, however,
issued its own apportionment plan, which used single and multimember districts in each House. Id.
690-91.
38. Id. at 692. In a later case the United States Supreme Court stated: "[Ulnless there are
persuasive justifications, a court ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use
of multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with
little more than de minimus variation." Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975) (footnote
omitted). See also Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978) (federal court plans are held to stricter
standards on review).
39. Gerrymandering has been defined as discriminatory districting, which operates to unduly
inflate the political strengti. of one group and deflate that of another. Dixon, supra note 2, at 255.
See also Greater Houston Civil Council v. Mann, 440 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (lower federal
court held that city-wide multimember district did not discriminate against Black and Mexican
American minorities). To date, neither racial nor political gerrymandering has been an issue in the
North Dakota litigation. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 19 (1975).
40. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). Connecticut's legislative apportionment plan
was based upon the "political fairness principle." Id. at 752. The plan achieved a rough
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the two major parties and provided each party
with a proportionate number of legislative seats. Id. at 738. The Supreme Court found no violation
of the equal portection clause.. Id. at 752, See also Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process: The
Continuing Quest for "FairandEffective Representation, " 14 HARVJ. LEG. 825, 835 (1977).
41. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
42. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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apportionment statute.4 3 The voters alleged that irregularly shaped
districts had been drawn on the basis of race in violation of the
4
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. "
The Supreme Court held that because there was no indication that
the state had drawn the lines contriving to segregate on the basis of
45
race, there was no violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the Supreme Court refused to recognize racial
gerrymandering as unconstitutional per se, 46 the Court indicated
that a plan may be found to violate the equal protection clause
when it can be proved that the legislature intended to discriminate
47
against voters because of their race or place of origin.
Finally, states must be concerned with the problem of
population deviation. In Reynolds the Court held that states are
required to make a good faith effort to construct districts that
48
would adhere to the standard of substantial population equality.
Although a strict standard of population equality is required for
congressional districting, 49 under Reynolds, state legislative
districting may be subject to greater population deviations,
provided the state is able to justify any deviations. 50 Thus the
United States Supreme Court held that a Missouri congressional
district plan which had a maximum population variance of 3.3
51
percent was invalid because the state lacked valid justifications.
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 53-55.
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id. at 56-58.
47. Id. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Black residents of Tuskegee,
Alabama were denied their preexisting right to vote in municipal elections under a new municipal
incorporation. Id. at 340-41. The Supreme Court stated that "[wihen a legislature singles out a
readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the
Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 346.
48. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). The Court in Reynolds described the deviation
requirement as follows:
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts
so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters.
Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.
Id. at 577 (footnote omitted). See also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (Court indicated
broader latitude permitted in state legislative apportionment).
49. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court required states to draw their
congressional districts so that as nearly as practicable one man's vote is worth as much as another's.
Id. at 7-8.
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court indicated that its Wesberry language
was to be read literally, when it struck down a congressional districting plan in which the mostpopulous district exceeded the ideal by 3.13%. Id. at 528-29. See also White v. Weisler, 412 U.S. 783
(1973) (congressional plan in which the most populous district exceeded the ideal by 2.43% was
struck down).
50. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). Seealso supra note 27.
51. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). In Kirkpatrick the United States Supreme Court
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On the other hand, in a case involving a state legislative districting
plan, the Court held that a total deviation of 9.9 percent was
permissible without any special justifications.5 2 Further, when a
state can justify the need for a deviation greater than 9.9 percent,
53
the Court has held the plan valid.
Although the United States Supreme Court has established
several principles governing the constitutionality of various
54
apportionment plans, the law in this area is by no means definite.
Also complicating the task of reapportioning is the highly political
matter of who should be responsible for drafting a plan. In North
Dakota the state legislature has in the past been designated the task.
Its success in formulating constitutional plans, however, has not
been free from controversy. The remainder of this Note will discuss
the history of apportionment law in North Dakota and suggest an
alternative to apportionment by a legislature.
III. THE HISTORY OF APPORTIONMENT IN NORTH
DAKOTA
Problems with reapportionment have existed in North Dakota
since its territorial days. 55 When the Constitutional Convention
convened in 1889, delegates encountered the problems of
establishing the basic elements of the legislative districting and of
drawing a map for the first elections. 56 The delegates drafted, and
the people of the state approved, sections 26, 29, 32, and 35 of the
Constitution of the State of North Dakota to govern the state's
57
apportionment.
stated that the adoption of a fixed numerical standard that would excuse population variances
without regard to circumstances would only serve to encourage legislators to strive for a de minimis
range of variation rather than population equality. Id. at 530-31.
52. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (Texas apportionment plan consisted of 79 single
member districts and 11 multimember districts and had a total deviation of 9.9% and an average
deviation of 1.82 %).
53. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (United States Supreme Court upheld Virginia
reapportionment plan, which had a maximum variation of 16.4%, based on the state's rational
justification of maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions). See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971) (New York apportionment plan for Rockland County government, which had a total
deviation of 11.9%, upheld based on the assertion of the long tradition of overlapping functions and
dual personnel in the county government and on the fact that the plan contained no built-in bias
favoring particular political intents or geographic areas). But see Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1
(1975) (United States Supreme Court held a North Dakota apportionment plan that had a 20%
deviation invalid, stating that the State's justification of maintaining the integrity of political
subdivisions was unpersuasive).
54. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967) (fact that one variation from the norm is
approved in one state has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another state).
55. See Dobson, supra note 1.
56. Id. at 282.
57. Section 26 of article II of the North Dakota Constitution stated: "The Senate shall be
composed of not less than thirty nor more than fifty members." N.D. CONST. art. II, S 26 (1889)
(amended, 1960)(found unconstitutional in Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964)).
Section 29 of article II of the North Dakota Constitution stated:

455

NOTE

In the years following the first constitutional convention, the
legislature at various times changed the size of the legislative
body. 58 In 1931 the North Dakota Legislature completed what was
to be its last effected reapportionment to this date. 59 Although the
legislature was required by the North Dakota Constitution to
reapportion after the federal census of 1940 and 1950, it failed to do
so.60 The state's apportionment plan remained the same until 1959
when the state legislature attempted to work out a permanent
solution. 6 1 Since 1959 the apportionment of North Dakota has been
the subject of various legislative enactments and court battles, 6 all

of which have left unsolved the problem of how to apportion North
Dakota.
A.

REAPPORTIONMENT
ELECTIONS

AFTER

1960

CENSUS

AND

THE

1962

In 1959 the Thirty-sixth Legislative Assembly passed
Resolution M, which amended sections 26, 29, and 35 of the
The legislative assembly shall fix the number of senators, and divide the state into as
many senatorial districts a there are senators, which districts, as nearly as may be,
shall be equal to each other in the number of inhabitants entitled to representation.
Each district shall be entitled to one senator and no more, and shall be composed of
compact and contiguous territories; and no portion of any county shall be attached to
any other county, or part thereof, so as to form a district. The districts as thus
ascertained and determined shall continue until changed by law.
N.D. CONST. art. II, S 29 (1889) (amended 1960) (found unconstitutional in Paulson v. Meier, 232
F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964)).
Section 32 of article II of the North Dakota Constitution stated: "The house of representatives
shall be composed of not less than sixty, nor more than one hundred forty members." N.D. CONST.
art. II, S 32 (1889) (current version N.D. CONST. art. IV, S 8).
Section 35 of article II of the North Dakota Constitution stated:
The members of the house of representatives shall be apportioned to and elected at
large from each senatorial district. The legislative assembly shall, in the year 1895,
and every tenth year cause an enumeration to be made of all the inhabitants of this
state, and shall at its first regular session after each such enumeration, and also after
each federal census, proceed to fix by law the number of senators, which shall
constitute the senate of North Dakota, and the number of representatives which shall
constitute the house of representatives of North Dakota, within the limits prescribed
by this Constitution, and at the same session shall proceed to reapportion the state into
senatorial districts as prescribed by this Constitution, and to fix the number of
members of the house of representatives to be elected from the several senatorial
districts; provided, that the Legislatiye Assembly may, at any regular session,
redistrict the state into senatorial districts, and apportion the senators and
representatives respectively.
N.D. CONST. art. II, § 35 (1889) (amended 1960) (found unconstitutional in Paulson v. Meier, 232
F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964)).
58. See Dobson, supra note 1, at 283-85.

59. 1931 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 7. See also Dobson, supra note 1, at 284-86; infa notes 60-188 and
accompanying text.

60. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2, Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
61. See 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 438, S. Con. Res. M.
62. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649 (D.N.D.
1975); Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Paulson v.
Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965); Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964); Lein v.
Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962); State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53 (N.D.

456

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

constitution. 63 The resolution was voted on and approved by the
people on June 28, 1960.64 Sections 26 and 32, as amended,
permanently fixed the number of senators and representatives,
while section 29, as amended, permanently fixed the district
boundaries as they existed at the time of the adoption of the
amendment. 65 Additionally, section 35, as amended, provided that
districts consisting of more than one county should have at least as
66
many representatives as there are counties in the district.
Amended section 35 also imposed upon the legislative assembly the
duty of apportioning members of the House of Representatives at
the first regular session after each federal decennial census. 67 In the
event the legislature failed to apportion the state during the first
session, section 35, as amended, provided that the duty to
apportion fell upon a special apportionment group. 6
In 1961 the legislative assembly failed to adopt an
apportionment plan as required by section 35. In accordance with
section 35, the apportionment group convened and attempted to
69
develop a plan within the constitutionally allotted ninety days.
1971); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962); State ex reL. Aamoth v. Sathre, 110
N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1961).
63. State ex re. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 682 (N.D. 1962). Senate Concurrent
Resolution M, a resolution for amendment of sections 26, 29, and 35 of the North Dakota
Constitution relating to the establishment of senatorial districts, representation from such senatorial
districts in the house of representatives, and the manner of reapportioning members elected to the
house of representatives after each federal decennial census, proposed to amend the Constitution as
follows:
Section 26. The senate shall be composed of forty-nine members.
Section 29. Each existing senatorial district as provided by law at the effective date of
this amendment shall permanently constitute a senatorial district. Each senatorial
district shall be represented by one senator and no more.
Section 35. Each senatorial district shall be represented in the House of
Representatives by at least one representative except that any senatorial district
comprised of more than one county shall be represented in the House of
Representatives by at least as many representatives as there are counties in such
senatorial district. In addition the Legislative Assembly shall, at the first regular
session after each federal decennial census, proceed to apportion the balance of the
members of the House of Representatives to be elected from the several senatorial
districts, within the limits prescribed by this Constitution, according to the population
of the several senatorial districts. If any legislative assembly whose duty it is to make
an apportionment shall fail to make the same as herein provided it shall be the duty of
the chief justice of the supreme court, attorney general, secretary of state, and the
majority and minority leaders of the House of Representatives within niney days after
the adjourment of the legislature to make such apportionment and when so made a
proclamation shall be issued by the chief justice announcing such apportionment
which shall have the same force and effect as though made by the Legislative
Assembly.
1959 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 438, S. Con. Res. M.
64. 1961 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 405.
65. See supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. SeealsoState exrel Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W. 2d679, 682 (1962).
69. Throughout the 1961-62 litigation, the apportionment group consisted of North Dakota
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The plan conceived by the group, referred to as the Burgum Plan,
enlarged the House of Representatives from 113 to 115 and
resulted in a reduced representation of some urban areas. 70 Prior to
the lapse of the ninety day period, a suit was brought before the
North Dakota Supreme Court by an urban resident challenging the
constitutionality of the plan. 7 1 The North Dakota Supreme Court
in State ex rel. Aamoth v. Sathre held that the action was technically
premature and the petitioner's request for relief was denied. 72 A
few months later the Burgum Plan was again challenged, this time
in federal district court.7 3 In Lein v. Sathre74 the plaintiffs, qualified
voters in North Dakota, requested declaratory and injunctive
relief. 75 The plaintiffs contended that the Burgum Plan would
create substantial inequality in the voting strength of individual
voters in various districts. 7 6 This challenge was directed primarily
at the portion of section 35 that allowed a district with more than
one county to have an additional representative for each county in
the district.7 7 The plaintiffs claimed that the provision disregarded
population and distributed political power unequally. 78
The United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota held that because the earlier Aamoth action had been
brought prematurely, the issues had not been properly presented to
the North Dakota Supreme Court. 79 As such, the plaintiffs' action
was stayed, pending the determinations of the North Dakota
Supreme Court Chief Justice P. 0. Sathre, Attorney General Leslie R. Burgum, Secretary of State
Ben Meier, and State Representatives Ben Wolf (R-Zeeland) and Arthur Link (D-Alexander). Lein.
v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D.N.D. 1962).
70. The Burgum Plan was based upon 49 senatorial districts and 115 representatives.
According to section 35, as amended, each senatorial district received one representative for each
county in the district. The remaining seats to be allotted totaled 54. To apportion these 54 seats, the
Burgum Plan gave an additional representative
to districts with populations over
districts over 24,000, four additional representatives to districts over 36,000. See Deposition of Leslie
R. Burgum at 14, Lein v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962).
71. State ex rel. Aamoth v. Sathre, 110 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1961).
72. Id. at 231 (opinion by Strutz, J.; Morris, Burke, Teigen, and Lynch, JJ., concurring;
Sathre, C. J., did not participate). The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that section 35 of the
North Dakota Constitution provided for an apportionment group that was legislatively appointed.
This group had not yet completed its work. No proclamation had been issued by the chief justice
announcing apportionment, and the 90-day period within which action by the apportionment group
was required had not expired. Since no proclamation had been made and the 90-day period had not
expired, the court held that the action of the apportionment group was not complete and, therefore,
not subject to challenge in the courts. Id.
73. Lein v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962).
74. 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962).
75. Id. at 538. This action was decided approximately two months before Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76. 201 F. Supp. at 538. The defendants contended that the court had no jurisdiction because
the action was political in nature, and the right of equality of voting strength was not guaranteed by
either the Constitution of the United States or by the Civil Rights Act. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 542 (three judge panel comprised of Vogel, Davies, and Register, JJ.).
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Supreme Court.8
The plaintiffs returned to the North Dakota Supreme Court
requesting relief in the action State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre.8 1 In this
action the plaintiffs asked the North Dakota Supreme Court to
declare the Burgum Plan void as violative of the North Dakota
Constitution8 2 and to restrain the secretary of state from holding
elections for the members of the House of Representatives until a
83
constitutional plan was adopted.
In order to determine the validity of the challenged Burgum
Plan, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined two
mathematical methods of calculating population distributions in
voting districts. The two methods, which have been used in other
states for apportioning, are referred to as the "Equal Proportion
formula" and the "Major Fraction formula."1 4 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, using the two formulas for comparison purposes,
found that there was a disparity between the number of
representatives allotted for each district under the Burgum Plan
and the number of representatives allotted for corresponding
districts apportioned under both the Equal Proportion method and
the Major Fraction method. 85 The difference between the Burgum
Plan and the two formulas affected sixteen districts, or
approximately one-third of the districts in the state.8 6 The North
Dakota Supreme Court, in concluding that the disparity indicated
that the apportionment group's Burgum Plan was not based upon
population, declared the Plan void. 87 The Court further stated that
the lack of a valid apportionment plan under section 35 would not
80. Id. at 542. Judge Davies dissented, asserting that the court presently had jurisdiction. Id.
81. 113 N.W.2d 679(N.D. 1962).
82. Id. at 681-82 (no question arising under the United States Constitution was presented to the
North Dakota court).
83. Id. at 687.
84. Id. at 685. For an explanation of the Equal Proportion formula and Major Fraction formula,
see generally Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941).
85. 113 N.W.2d at 686. For an example of the differences among the three methods, compare
the number of representatives for each district below:
Equal
Major
Burgum
District
Proportion
Fraction
Plan
Population
County
No.
7
7
5
42,041
WARD
29
36

MCINTOSH,

7
37

LOGAN
GRANO FORKS
RICHLAND

12,071
20,514
8,303

3
3
2

2
4
1

2
4
1

Id.
86. Id. at 687.
87. Id. The court stated:
The variance of ratios and the degree of each variance, which we have pointed out,
and the many departures from the results of the formulas shown by the table impel us
to hold that the apportionment made by the group violates the constitutional mandate
of apportionment according to the population of the several districts and is void.
Id. (opinion by Morris, J; Burke, Teigen, Lynch, JJ., concurring; Strutz,J., dissenting in part).
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prevent the secretary of state from conducting the general
election. 8 8 Therefore, for purposes of the upcoming election, the
last valid apportionment law, adopted in 1931, would be used to
determine the voting districts.8 9 The plaintiffs did not return to the
federal district court where the action had been stayed.
In 1963, with the next meeting of the legislative assembly, an
apportionment plan was adopted when the assembly passed House
Bill 653.90 Notwithstanding the North Dakota Supreme Court's
decision in State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, the plan was adopted in
accordance with sections 26, 29, and 35 of article II of the North
Dakota Constitution, as previously amended. 91 In Paulson v. Meier9 2
the plaintiffs, qualified voters of North Dakota, brought suit in
federal court to have sections 26, 29, and 35 and section 54-03-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code (House Bill 653) declared
unconstitutional as being violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 9 The United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota evaluated the plaintiffs' assertions in
light of Reynolds v. Sims. 94 The three judge district court held that
North Dakota's existing apportionment plan failed to assure all
citizens an equally effective vote in the election of representatives
and significantly undervalued the weight of the votes of certain
citizens merely because of their residence. 95 The United States
District Court, therefore, declared sections 26, 29, and 35, as
amended, and section 54-03-01 violative of the equal protection
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 96
88. Id.
89. Id. The last valid apportionment law was the 1931 apportionment. 1931 N.D. Seis. Laws
ch. 7.
90. 1963 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 345.
91. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D.N.D. 1964). House Bill 653 reduced the size of
the house from 113 to 109, decreasing the number of representatives from each of the five most
populous districts by one and giving one seat to District 37 (part of Richland County). Affidavit of
Dr. John Bond, Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
92. 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
93. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D.N.D. 1962). Section 54-03-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code (House Bill 653) created the situation in which 26 districts with 26 senators
represented 212,199 people; 23 districts with 23 senators represented 420,247 people; and seven of
the twenty-three districts with seven senators represented 239,068 people. The plaintiffs contended
that this scheme constituted invidious discrimination. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 2, Paulson v.
Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
94. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
95. 232 F. Supp. at 187. The federal district court stated that sections 26 and 29 of the
constitution and section 54-03-01 failed to consider population as a prime factor. Id. at 186. The
court emphasized population deviations presented in House Bill 653, noting the following examples:
District 43 (Renville County - 4,698) one senator; District 29 (Minot and part of rural Ward County
- 42,041) one senator; and District 9 (Fargo - 38,494) one senator. Id. Furthermore, the court stated
that the mulhicounty district plan of section 35 was invalid. Id. at 186-87. Examples of the disparities
within the multicounty plan of section 35 are as follows: District 39 (Billings, Bowman, Slope, and
Golden Valley counties - 10,660) four representatives; District 25 (Dickey County - 8,147) one
represenative; and District 3 (Walsh County - 8,423) two representatives. Id. at 187.
96. Id. at 186 (opinion by Register, J., Vogel, .J. concurring; Davies, J. dissenting in part,
asserting that the court should not permit a de facto legislative assembly to meet, legislate, and
attempt to enact a reapportionment law in 1965).
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The three judge district court did not stop at declaring the
challenged plan and constitution sections void. The court also
considered the 1931 apportionment plan and found it to be
unconstitutional. 97 In sum, the court concluded that all of North
Dakota's. legislative apportionment law was invalid. 98 Recognizing
that the state was without a constitutional apportionment law, the
court drew several conclusions. First, because the state had already
held a primary election that year, the court did not feel inclined to
require the state to go through the expense of nullifying those
results and of holding a special primary election under a courtordered apportionment plan. 9 9 Second, the court felt that in
fairness the state ought to be given an opportunity to comply with
the requirements of the recently decided Reynolds case. 100 Third, the
court determined that the next legislative assembly should be
elected under existing law (the 1931 plan) and be given de facto
status for the next session (1965) at which time the legislature would
adopt a valid apportionment plan. 10 1
B. 1965

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND

1966-1970

ELECTIONS

At the time of the judgment in Paulson v. Meier, and prior to the
meeting of the Thirty-ninth Legislative Assembly (1965), a
subcommittee of the North Dakota Legislative Research
Committee was engaged in rewriting the North Dakota
97. Id. at 187.
98. Id. The court held as follows:
We therefore hold that the 1931 apportionment statute is vulnerable to the same
consititutional attack as its amendment, and we hereby find and declare it to be
constitutionally invalid. We further find and declare that any and all existing laws of
this state relating to legislative apportionment which limit or prescribe district areas or
boundaries, or apportion the members of the legislative assembly on any basis other
than population, are unconstitutional and void. It is our conclusion, and we so hold,
that there is no constitutionally valid legislative apportionment law in existence in the
State of North Dakota at this time.
Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 189-90.
101. Id. at 190. The court described the situation as follows:
We hold that the Thirty-ninth Legislative Assembly (1965) of North Dakota,
consisting of members elected under existing law, will have a de facto status; that at
such regular session it should promptly devise and pass legislation creating and
establishing a system of legislative districting and apportionment consistent with
federal constitutional standards; that the effective date of this Order and Decree will be
stayed until after the 1964 general elections have been held and for a reasonable time
after the commencement of the 1965 Legislative Assembly in order to afford such
Assembly a reasonable and adequate opportunity to enact such apportionment
legislation.
Id. The de facto status is "used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or state of
affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. " Id. at 191 n. 1.
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Constitution. The committee, realizing that the Thirty-ninth
Session would have an enormous task in reapportioning the state,
proceeded to study and prepare an apportionment plan to present
to the legislature. To help prepare the plan, the subcommittee
engaged the services of R. R. Smith, a specialist in legislative
apportionment.1 0 2 The plan devised by Smith, after two public
hearings, was approved by the committee and submitted to the
1965 Assembly as Senate Bill 39. 103
Senate Bill 39 caused "considerable consternation" among
the members of the legislature. 104 A problem evolved from the fact
that county lines were disregarded and five multimember districts
were formed. 105 The consternation caused an inundation of
alternative plans to be presented to the legislature. Although all
plans were based on Smith's population figures, each plan retained
the county boundary lines that suited the particular drafter's
purpose. The legislature finally narrowed the viable alternatives to
Senate Bill 39, the Dobson Plan (which came in three alternative
plans and retained all county lines), and the Johnson Plan (which
was similar to Senate Bill 39 but which also considered economic
and social factors, particularly those of the area west of the
106
Missouri River).
The legislature did not adopt an apportionment plan until the
last day of the session. This plan, House Bill 566, was written by
the majority and minority leaders of each house and the two
chairmen of the state and federal committees. 10 7 A question of good
faith, or lack thereof, loomed over the newly enacted bill to the
extent that Governor William Guy allowed House Bill 566 to
become law without his signature on July 1, 1965.108
Following the enactment of the new apportionment law, the
defendant from the 1964 Paulson v. Meier case filed a motion for
dismissal and clarification with the United States district court. 109
The plaintiffs objected to the motion stating that the legislature had
failed to apportion according to federal constitutional standards
102. SeeBriefAmicus Curiae at 4, Paulsen v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
103 Id. Senate Bill 39 divided the state into forty-nine senatorial districts, with two representatives in each district. The total population deviation of Senate Bill 39 was 27.98%. Id.
Total population deviation is determined by taking the populations of the most populated and least
populated districts and calculating the percentage difference between each of the two districts as
against the average population per district. The resulting two percentages added together equal the
total population deviation.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5, Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
107. Id. at 6, Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964).
108. N.D. Cent. Code S54-03-01 (1965). Seealso Brief Amicus Curiae at 1, Paulson v. Meier,
232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964); Dobson, supra note 1, at 286.
109. Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D.N.D. 1965).
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and alleged that House Bill 566 was discriminatory and not
consistent with constitutional standards. 110 Further, the plaintiffs
asked that the district court devise an apportiqnment plan which
would be consistent with Reynolds. 111
In response to the plaintiffs' request, the United States district
court agreed to determine the validity of House Bill 566. The
district court, in evaluating House Bill 566, recognized that
Reynolds permitted some flexibility in population deviation by
allowing states to maintain political subdivisions and to provide for
compact districts of contiguous territory if these factors were a part
of a rational state policy.11 2 The total variation in House Bill 566
diluted the voting strength of more than one-eighth of the
population of the state. 13 The United States district court found
no "apparent rational design" to justify the variations, nor any
state policy that would merit special consideration."14 Moreover,
the defendant failed to show any unusual circumstances that
would have given validity to the plan."' The district court thus
concluded that House Bill 566 had failed to meet the "good faith
effort" test'1 6 of establishing districts that were substantially
equal in population." 7 The court, therefore, denied the
defendant's motion and declared House Bill 566 unconstitutional
8
as a violation of the equal protection clause. "1
Upon finding House Bill 566 invalid, the United States
district court had to determine how the state should be
apportioned. The defendant requested that House Bill 566 remain
valid for an interim period, during which time the bill would be
rewritten according to the court's direction. 1 9 The district court,
however, rejected the request and after evaluating and
restructuring parts of Senate Bill 39, adopted it as the new
apportionment plan for North Dakota.120 The new plan, although
court-ordered, represented the first plan since 1931 to be fully
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 39. SeeReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-79(1964).
113. 246 F. Supp. at 41. The variation in House Bill 566, at times, exceeded the ratio of 1.3 to 1.
Id. at 39, 40. The ratio compared voting strength of a person in one district with the voting strength
of a person in a different district. The ratio was based on the total population in each district and the
number of representatives from that district. The variation of one district was 19.4% above the
average ratio of one senator and two representatives per 11,933 persons. Id. at 39.
114. 246 F. Supp. at 42.
115. Id. The court found that the plan was not the result of an attempt to keep legislative
districts within county lines, but the result of an "eleventh hour" compromise, which did not
consider population as a basis for fair and equitable representation. Id.
116. Id. at 43. See also quoted language from Reynolds supra note 48.
117. 246 F. Supp. at 43.
118. Id. (opinion by Register, J.; Vogel and Davies, JJ., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 44-46.
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implemented. The plan remained unsuccessfully challenged
until the 1970 census complicated matters.
C.

REAPPORTIONMENT AFTER THE

1974

1970

CENSUS AND THE

121

1972-

ELECTIONS

In 1971 the task of reapportioning North Dakota was further
complicated by a political dispute over the possible use of
multimember districts, the increase in size of the two military bases
located in the state, and the United States Census Bureau's failure
to acknowledge township and precinct boundaries when the 1970
census was conducted. 122 Understandably, the 1971 legislative
assembly failed to reapportion the state. For the sixth time in ten
years an action was commenced challenging the apportionment of
North Dakota. 123 Unlike prior cases, however, the issues presented
in Chapman v. MeierI24 were eventually decided by the United States
Supreme Court.
In Chapman the plaintiffs alleged that the court-ordered plan
from Paulson v. Meier in 1965 no longer reflected the shifts in
population indicated by the 1970 census and, as such, the plan no
longer complied with the guarantees of the equal protection
clause. 125 Initially, the plaintiffs sought to have the three judge
federal district court issue a court-ordered apportionment plan
that would do the following: (1) Declare the 1965 plan invalid; (2)
limit districting to single-member districts; (3) be based on the 1970
census figures; and (4) restrain the secretary of state from
126
administering the primary election laws under the 1965 plan.
On May 22, 1972, the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota entered an order declaring the 1965 plan
invalid. 27 The court stated that sufficient time existed to effect a
121. But see State exrel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1971). In Stockman the
petitioners contended that the multimember districts created by the district court in Paulson v. Meier
violated section 29 o! the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 55. The petitioners argued that
only the first portion had not been affected by the district court's ruling in Paulson. Id. at 56. The
North Dakota Supreme Court assumed that when section 29 had been ratified by the voters, the
section as a whole, rather than individual portions, had been voted on. Thus, the court held that if
one portion of section 29 was invalid, the entire section was invalid. Id.
122. See Dobson, supra note 1,at 287.
123. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). See
Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965); Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D.
1964); Lein v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962); State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184
N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1971); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962); State ex rel.
Aamoth v. Sathre, 110 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1961).
124. 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
125. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363, 364 (D.N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 364 (per curiam opinion; Bright, Benson, Van Sickle, JJ., participating). The court
stated that shifts in the population had created constitutionally impermissible variations in the
apportionment plan. Id.
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new apportionment plan before the 1972 primary deadline for the
filing of petitions for ballot access. 12 8 The apportionment plan was
to be designed by the United States district court with the help of
three special masters. 12 9 The court gave the masters a set of
guidelines to follow in designing a new apportionment plan.13 0 A
plan referred to as the Dobson Plan was adopted by the district
court "for the 1972 election only."''
The Dobson Plan provided for thirty-eight senatorial districts,
five of which were multimember.13 2 In light of a recent United
States Supreme Court decision stating that single-member districts
were preferable to large multimember districts in court-ordered
plans, 3 the district court attempted to minimize the number of
multimember districts in the Dobson Plan. 34 The district court
concluded, however, that a discontinuation of the existing
multimember districts would disrupt the elective process, and
therefore retained those districts within the Plan for the 1972
128. Id. Although the action was instituted in November 1971, a three judge district court was
not requested until the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 8, 1972. Chapman v. Meier,
372 F. Supp. 371, 382 (D.N.D. 1974). Candidates for legislative offices had to file the petitions to get
their names on the ballot prior toJuly 27, 1972. Id. at 364 n.l.
129. 372 F. Supp. at 364-65. Special masters included Mr. R. R. Smith of Grand Forks, North
Dakota; Mr. Richard Dobson of Minot, North Dakota; and Mr. Thomas K. Ostenson of Fargo,
North Dakota. Id. at 364.
130. Id. at 364. The following guidelines were given to the Commission:
a. The Commission shall try to conform new legislative districts to the existing
districts.
b. The Commission shall not substantially change the size of the Legislature.
c. Natural geographic barriers shall be observed.
d. Existing political subdivision lines should be observed, in so far as possible.
e. In the event the Commission should find that it is unnecessary to substantially alter
any one or more of the legislative districts presently defined, then it must consider
and make recommendations relative to whether or not the incumbent senator os
senators, whose term does not expire at the end of this year, must nevertheless
stand for election in 1972.
Id. at 377.
131. Id. at 367. For text of Dobson Plan, see Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363, 369-71
(N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). The statistical comparison of the 1965 Plan and Dobson Plan
included:
Number of Districts
Number of Senators
Number of Representatives
County lines broken
Avg. pop. per senator
Most populous district
Least populous district
Pct. diviation over avg.
Pct. deviation under avg.
Deviation ratio

1965 Plan
39
49
98
(
13
12,907
14,214
11,I339
10.1%
12.1%
1.25 to 1

Dobson Plan
38
51
102
10
12,113
13,176
10,728
8.8%
11.4%
1.23 to 1

Id. at 365 n.4. The plan recognized that the interests of the persons residing on the military bases
were more "closely aligned" with urban interests and therefore were included within the populations
of nearby urban districts. Id. at 365,
132. Id. at'365-66.
133. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971).
134. 372 F. Supp. at 365-67.
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elections. 135

The court concluded by ordering the special masters to
continue work on a permanent plan that would be
constitutionally valid. 136 The defendants asked the court to refrain
from implementing a plan which would be in effect beyond the
1972 elections, explaining that the 1973 legislative assembly ought
to have an opportunity to adopt its own plan. 13 7 The United States
district court granted a stay on its adoption of a "permanent" plan,
stating that it was unlikely that any prejudice would result by
deferring the action. 138 The court, however, ordered that the North
Dakota attorney general file a report concerning any action taken
39
by the legislative assembly. 1
The legislative assembly enacted a new apportionment bill,
House Bill 1042, in February 1973. The bill contained the same
multimember districts as the Dobson Plan, but broke fewer county
lines. 140 The legislature overrode the veto of Governor Arthur
Link, and House Bill 1042 became law. 14 1
In the ensuing months, the implementation of House Bill 1042
was suspended by a referendum petition. 4 2 On December 4, 1973,
a special election was held and the referendum was defeated.143 The
vote nullifying House Bill 1042 resulted in the state's once again
being without a valid apportionment law.
After the special election, the defendant in the still pending
Chapman proceeding requested the United States district court to
adopt the Dobson Plan as the "permanent" apportionment
plan.1 44 The plaintiffs, however, objected to the reinstitution of the
Plan because of the existence of multimember districts and the
Plan's population variance. 145 Notwithstanding the objection, the
court adopted the Dobson Plan as North Dakota's permanent
apportionment law. 146 The court held that the use of the
135. Id. at 366.
136. Id. at 368. The special masters were to submit a plan to the district court by November 10,
1972. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 131 for Dobson Plan statistics; see also 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 411,
House Bill 1042. House Bill 1042 provided for 37 legislative districts, each having one
senator and two representatives, except for the five multimember districts. The total deviation was
6.8% and the average population in the district was 12,355. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 12
(1975).
141. 372 F. Supp. at 387.
142. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws at 1549. Along with the referendum, an initiative petition was
circulated which proposed an amendment to the North Dakota Constitution. The amendment would
have created a commission to reapportion North Dakota and would have mandated single member
districts. 372 F. Supp. at 387.
143. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 12 (1975).
144. 372 F. Supp. at 374.
145. Id. at 373.
146. Id. at 379 (opinion by Benson,J.; Van Sickle, J., concurring; Bright, J., dissenting).
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multimember districts was a political question, which should be
resolved by the electorate or the legislature.' 1 7 With regard to
population variances, the court stated that "once a plan has been
formulated ... [and] fairly meets the constitutional requirements,
a court should not continue to sift and shuffle abstract figures solely
to arrive at a mathematically perfect plan. "1418
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. Meier.14 9 The Supreme Court described the controversy
in the opening statement of the Chapman opinion as the culmination
of a ten year struggle, which had been totally ineffectual on the
legislative side. 150
The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman concerned both the multimember districts and the
population variance. The Court noted three basic rules with regard
to multimember districts. First, multimember districts are not per
se unconstitutional.15 1 Second, when district courts create
15 2
apportionment plans, single-member districts should be utilized.
Third, a district court may use multimember districts when
"unique factors" are articulated which justify the usage. 153
Applying the rules to the facts in Chapman, the United States
Supreme Court first analyzed the history of multimember districts
in North Dakota. The Court found that multimember districts had
traditionally existed in the House of Representatives but not in the
Senate. 154 The Court determined, therefore, that state policy did
not justify the use of multimember districts in the Senate. Further,
the Court found that the defendants had not articulated any
''unique circumstances" which justified an exception to the state
policy. 155

The Chapman Court also concluded that its preference for
single-member districting over court-ordered multimember
districting 156 was not dependent upon an allegation of
147. Id. at 377
148. Id. at 379.
149. 420 U.S. 1 (1975). Probable jurisdiction was noted by the United States Supreme Court at
416 U.S. 966 (1974).
150. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 3 (1975).
151. Id. at 15. See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
152. 420 U.S. at 18. Seealso Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971).
153. 420 U.S. at 19. See also Mahan v- Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973); Carpeneti, Legislative
Apportionment: Multimember DistrictsandFairRepresentation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666, 694-95 (1972).
154. 420 U.S. at 14. Only four instances of multimembership on the senate side have existed:
(1) court-ordered multimember districts in Paulson (1965); (2) those imposed as temporarily
expedient immediately before the 1972 election; (3) those established by provisions of House Bill
1042, enacted by the 1973 legislature; and (4) those applied by the United States district court as a
"permanent solution" in the judgement presently under review. Id. at 14-15.
155. Id. at 19.
156. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1970) (United States Supreme Court stated a general
preference for single-member districts in court-ordered plans).
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discrimination. 15" Thus, the defendant's assertion that no
minorities were discriminated against by the Plan failed. 158 As
such, the Court held that single-member district should be restored
in North Dakota unless the district court could articulate "unique
circumstances" justifying the continuation of multimember
districts or unless the 1975 legislative assembly should institute the
59
use of multimember districts. 1
The second aspect of the North Dakota plan challenged by the
plaintiffs was the population disparities between the various
senatorial districts. The United States Supreme Court found a
variance of 20.14 percent in the North Dakota plan. This variance
was considered "constitutionally impermissible in the absence of
significant state policies ....
",160 In an attempt to overcome the
burden of proof, four reasons for the variance were submitted by
the defendants. The reasons included the following: (1) The
absence of electorally victimized minorities; (2) the fact that North
Dakota is sparsely populated; (3) the geographic division of the
state by the Missouri River; and (4) the goal of observing political
subdivisions. 61 The Court found none of these reasons
persuasive. 16 2 The Court stated that the lack of a minimization or
cancellation of the voting power of a particular voting or political
group did not justify a twenty percent variance. 163 The Court
observed that the vote of each individual in a state with a small
population may be even more important to the outcome of the
election than in a larger state. 164 Moreover, legislative history
indicated a nonadherence to geographic and political lines in the
state. 165 Thus, the defendants failed to present significant state
157. 420 U.S. at20.
158. Id.
159. Id. at21.
160. Id. at 24.
161. Id. at 24-25.
162. Id. at 25-26.
163. Id. at 24. The Court stated that "[all citizens are affected when an apportionment plan
provides disproportionate voting strength, and citizens in districts that are underrepresented lose
something even if they do not belong to a specific minority group." Id.
164. Id. at 25. The Court stated:
[S]parse population is not a legitimate basis for a departure from the goal of equality.
A State with a sparse population may face problems different from those faced by one
with a concentrated population, but that, without more, does not permit a substantial
deviation from the average. Indeed, in a State with a small population, each
individual vote may be more important to the result of an election than in a highly
populated State. Thus, particular emphasis should be placed on establishing districts
with as exact population equality as possible. The District Court's bare statement that
North Dakota's sparse population permitted or perhaps caused the 20% deviation is
inadequate justification.
Id. at 24-25. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 25. The Court discussed the legitimacy of the defendant's arguments regarding the
observation of geographic and political lines as follows:
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policy to justify the plan, and the population variance was
significantly impermissible. 166 The Court reversed the judgment of
'the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. In
reversing, the United States Supreme Court expressed its hopes
that the North Dakota Legislative Assembly in 1975 would enact a
167
constitutional plan.
D.

REAPPORTIONMENT IN NORTH DAKOTA

1975-1980

Using the Supreme Court's decision from Chapman as a guide,
the 1975 legislative assembly went about the task of reapportioning
the state. The legislature produced Senate Bill 1497, referred to as
Dobson 11.168 Unique to the Dobson II Plan was an opening section
that detailed the legislative intent and justifications behind the
plan. 16 9 The legislature apparently had interpreted the Chapman
holding as indicating that a statement of intent would alleviate any
problems with the use of multimember districts and a high
[Tihe suggestion that the division of the State caused by the Missouri River and the
asserted state policy of observing existing geographical and political subdivision
boundaries warrant departure from population equality is also not persuasive. It is far
from apparent that North Dakota policy currently requires or favors strict adherence
to political lines. As the dissenting judge in this case noted, appellee's counsel
acknowledged that reapportionment proposed by the Legislative Assembly broke
county lines, 372 F. Supp., at 393 n. 22, and the District Court indicated as long as a
decade ago that the legislature had abandoned the strict policy. Paulson v. Meier, 246 F.
Supp., at 42-43. Furthermore, a plan devised by Special Master Ostenson
demonstrates that neither the Missouri River nor the policy of maintaining township
lines prevents attaining a significantly lower population variance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
166. Id. at 26. The Court noted that the factors cited by the defendants could be neither
controlling nor persuasive when plans such as the Ostenson plan (5.95 % population variance) exist.
Id. In conclusion, the Court stated:
[Ulnless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a
state legislature must avoid use of multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily
achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.
Where important and significant state considerations rationally mandate departure
from these standards, it is the reapportioning court's responsibility to articulate
precisely why a plan of single-member districts with minimal population variance
cannot be adopted.
Id. at 26-27 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 27. (opinion by Blackmun, J., for a unanimous Court). The Court expressed its
hopes as follows:
We say once again what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment is
primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body,
rather than of a federal court. . . . It is to be hoped that the 1975 North Dakota
Legislative Assembly will perform that duty and enact a constitutionally acceptable
plan. If it fails in that task, the responsibility falls on the District Court and it should
proceed with dispatch to resolve this seemingly interminable problem.
Id.
168. Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649, 650 (D.N.D. 1975).
169. Section one of Senate Bill 2497 states in part, as follows:
SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS. The legislative
assembly finds and declares that:
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population variance. The Dobson II Plan still contained one
multimember district and a high population variance 170
1. The senate should be maintained from forty-eight to fifty-two members in
order to effectively represent the citizens of the state and to adequately review and
study proposed legislation. By providing for such a size senate, a certain population
variance is assured due to a combination of factors referred to in this section; however,
although a legislative apportionment plan could possibly be formulated with a smaller
population variance than the plan provided by this Act, such a plan would necessitate
a smaller legislative assembly with geographically large legislative districts which
would substantially reduce the personal contact citizens have with their elected
legislators. Such geographically large legislative districts would result from the fact
that the state has a population density of only 8.9 residents per square mile and, in
some instances, portions of the state comprise relatively uninhabited territory of up to
72 square miles.
2. Traditionally and historically, except for court-fashioned legislative
apportionment plans, the state legislative assembly has been comprised of singlemember senate districts and multi-member districts.
3. Multi-member senate districts should be avoided in legislative apportionment
plans unless a unique combination of factors justifies very limited use of multi-member
senate districts ....
4. The state has a policy dating from statehood in 1889 of preserving county
boundaries in legislative apportionment plans. This policy was firmly established in
section 29 of the state constitution which provided that "no portion of any county shall
be attached to any other county, or part thereof, so as to form a district" and,
although the section was amended in 1960, the substance of the amendment was to
preserve the legislative districting plan then in effect which recognized county lines in
every district.
6. The natural boundary caused by the Missouri River is very real in that onethird of the state lies west of the river, and of the three hundred fifty-five mile length of
the river only six crossings exist, four of which are located in urban areas. Any
legislative district crossing the Missouri River would cause extreme hardship to the
residents of the district and to the electoral process.
7. The sparse population of rural areas of the state, combined with the policy of
maintenance of political subdivision boundaries and recognition of the natural
boundary caused by the Missouri River, justifies deviations from population equality
in legislative districts with this unique combination of factors.
13. Adoption of a legislative reapportionment plan substantially different from
current North Dakota legislative apportionment would require that all state senators
again stand for election in 1976, and additional drastic changes in legislative district
boundaries would increase voter disenchantment with the legislative process and
reduce the personal relationships many persons have with their elected
representatives.
15. Because of the state policies which encourage the minimization of disruption
of electoral processes and the preservation of as many county lines as practicable, the
present legislative apportionment plan is the best and most reasonable plan for the
state until a new census is conducted which includes population figures collected on a
township and city block basis which would enhance the ability to reapportion on the
basis of equal representation. Present census figures available for the 1970 census show
that the census districts do not coincide with established township boundaries and,
except for the city of Fargo, provide no accurate block census figures for the five
largest cities of the state.
16. The methods and procedures employed by the census bureau in taking the
census and the creation of census districts do not coincide with the boundaries of
political subdivisions of the state. In an attempt to obtain accurate population data for
political subdivisions and for block areas within certain cities, population figures have
been interpolated and calculated under methods designed to reflect the population of
those areas. Recognition is made of the fact that in fashioning the original legislative
reapportionment plan, similar methods and procedures were used by the courts
involved.
1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 463.
170. Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649, 650 (D.N.D. 1975). The Chapman court of 1975
explained that "[u]nder Dobson II, the North Dakota Legislature merely modified the Dobson Plan
[which was the subject of the earlier Chapman litigation] by subdividing the multi-senator districts
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A challenge of Dobson II was brought before the United States
district court in the 1975 remanded case of Chapman v. Meier. 171 The
plaintiffs contended that the 20.17 percent population deviation of
the Dobson II Plan was too high.1 72 Further, it was alleged that
Dobson II was actually the same plan as Dobson I and, as such,
73
was invalid under the equal protection clause. 1
The United States district court decided two issues in the
remanded Chapman case. The first issue involved the problem of
whether the variances in Dobson II constituted a constitutional
violation. 7 4 Citing a recent United States Supreme Court
decision,1 75 the three judge district court stated that districts with
deviations larger than 9.9 percent would not be tolerable without
justification based on significant state policy. 176 As such, the state
must justify the 20.17 percent variation.
The district court evaluated the justifications adopted by the
state as found in the opening section of Senate Bill 2497, Dobson II.
This section purportedly reiterated the state policy considerations
presented by the state to the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman (1974). Upon reevaluating the primary justification of
preserving county lines, the district court held the justification
insufficient and the Dobson II Plan unconstitutional.1 7 7 The district
court permanently enjoined the implementation of the Dobson II
Plan and ordered Special Master Ostenson to revise an earlier
1 79
plan178 and to submit the plan to the court.
The Ostenson Plan, along with the plans of other interested
parties, was submitted to the district court. 180 On December 17,
1975, the court adopted a "final plan" and declared that the plan
would govern the 1976 election and subsequent elections until duly
modified.1 "' This court-ordered plan has served as North Dakota's
into single-senator districts - with one exception." Id. at 650. "Consequently, the net result of the
Legislature's passage of Dobson II was the enactment of an apportionment plan with substantially
the same deviations and total population variance found in Dobson but with only one multi-senator
subdistrict." Id.
171. 407 F. Supp. 649 (D.N.D. 1975).
172. Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649, 650 (D.N.D. 1975). The plaintiffs did not challenge
the establishment ofa multi-senator subdistrict or the establishment of districts or subdistricts. Id.
173. Id. at 651.
174. Id.
175. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
176. 407 F. Supp. at 651.
177. Id. at 654 (violation of equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment) (opinion by Van
Sickle, J., Bright, J., concurring; Benson, J., dissenting in part).
178. Id. The Ostensen Plan was submitted to the district court in 1972 in the original Chapman v.
Meier. The district court at that time adopted the Dobson Plan. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp.
363, 367 (D.N.D. 1972), rev'd, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). See also supra note 164 (quote of United States
Supreme Court indicating preference for Ostensen Plan).
179. 407 F. Supp. at 654.
180. Id. at 663. A public hearing was held on October 22, 1975. The district court devised a
final plan drawn from all the material that was submitted to the court. Id.
181. Id. For text of the "final plan" see Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649, 665-69 (1975).
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apportionment law until this time.
In 1977 the North Dakota Legislature began the long process of
"housecleaning" the laws of the state in order to begin the decade
of the eighties with a clean slate. 182 In 1979 the legislature resolved
to finally repeal sections 26 through 44 of article II of the North
Dakota Constitution and to adopt new apportionment provisions in
their place. 183 The resolution was placed on the general election
ballot in November 1980 and was defeated. 184 Because of the
defeat, North Dakota was left without any state constitutional or
statutory law governing the state's reapportioning process. For the
purposes of the 1980 election, the court-ordered plan of Chapman
(1975) was still effective. 185 In light of the 1980 census, it can be
expected that this plan will be challenged in the same manner as the
court-ordered plan was challenged after the 1970 census. 186 It can
also be expected that, due to the shift of population in North
Dakota since 1970,187 the "final plan" will also be found
182. In 1977 the legislative assembly resolved that section 214 of the North Dakota
Constitution, which dealt in part with the original legislative apportionment, be repealed. 1977 N.D.
Sess. Laws ch. 607. The resolution went before the people and was approved on September 5, 1978.
1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 691.
183. House Concurrent Resolution No. 3001 states in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. The senate shall be composed of not less than thirty nor more than fifty-two
members and the house of representatives shall be composed of not less than sixty nor
more than one hundred four members, which jointly are designated as the legislative
assembly of the State of North Dakota
Section 2. Senators shall be elected for terms of four years, and representatives for
terms of two years.
Section 5. The legislative assembly shall fix the number of senators and
representatives and divide the state into as many senatorial districts of compact and
contiguous territory as there are senators. The districts as thus ascertained and
determined after the 1980 federal decennial census shall continue until the
adjournment of the first regular session after each federal decennial census, or until
changed by law.
The legislative assembly shall guarantee as nearly as practicable, that every
person is equal to every other person in the state in the casting of ballots for legislative
candidates. One senator and at least two representatives shall be apportioned to each
senatorial district and be elected at large or from subdistricts thereof. The legislative
assembly may combine two senatorial districts only when a single-member senatorial
district includes a federal facility or federal installation, containing over three-fourths
of the population of a single-member senatorial district, and may provide for the
election of senators at large and representatives at large or from subdistricts thereof.
1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 710.
184. 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 663.
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
187. An example of the shift of the population in North Dakota is exemplified by the following
comparison:
County
Burleigh
Cass
Emmons
Grand Forks
Morton
Mountrail
Stark

1980 Population
54,839
88,243
5,838
66,088
25,069
7,663
23,703

1970 Population
40,714
73,653
7,200
61,102
20,310
8,437
19,613
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unconstitutional. Recognizing the probable unconstitutionality of
the present plan and the historical frustration of the North Dakota
Legislature in its apportioning attempts, the legislature should
consider alternatives to legislative apportionment.1 88
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO LEGISLATIVE
REAPPORTIONMENT
A.

COMPARATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT LAWS

Prior to discussing an alternative to reapportionment by the
legislature, it may be helpful to briefly address existing state reapportionment practices, in particular, who is initially responsible for drafting an apportionment plan. 189 Responsibility for
designing an apportionment plan is normally delegated by the
state's constitution. 190 In several states, however, statutory law
Walsh
Wells
Williams

15,381
6,983
22,263

16,251
7,848
19,301

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, 1-11 (Preliminary
Reports, 1980).
188. The problem for apportionment by the legislature is enhanced also by the federal district
court's declaration in Paulson v. Meier that sections 26, 29, and 35 of the North Dakota Constitution
are invalid. See supra notes 63, 70, 103, and accompanying text. The district court's striking down of
these sections and the failure of the legislature, see supra note 182, and people of North Dakota, see
supra notes 182-84, to adopt any new laws to replace these sections may give rise to challenges
directed at the legislature's authority to adopt a reapportionment plan. The lack of statutory or state
constitutional directives may give rise to a situation in North Dakota in which there is a mandate for
a new apportionment plan, but no expressed authorization for any state governmental body to adopt
a new plan. It is for this reason also that the legislature should consider adopting new laws governing
the apportionment process. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 54-03-01.5 (Supp. 1979) (statute fails to
specifically designate reapportionment authority).
189. In Reynolds the United States Supreme Court stated that legislative reapportionment is
primarily a matter for legislative consideration, but when the legislature fails, judicial relief becomes
appropriate. 377 U.S. at 586. Between 1962 and 1972, court-ordered apportionment plans were
devised for at least 21 states because the state reapportionment procedure failed to produce
acceptable results. Those states include the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming. Adams,
A Model State ReapportidnmentProcess, supra note 40, at 851 n.96.
190. ALA. CONST. art. IX, %5199 & 200; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-11; ARIz. CONST. art. 4,
pt. 2 5 1; ARK. CONST. art. 8, amend. 45; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, 5 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 46-48;
CONN. CONST. art. 3, S 6; DEL. CONST. art. II, §5 2 & 2A; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16; GA. CONST. art.
III, §5 2-801 & 2-901; HAWAII CONST. art. IV, 5 1-10; IDAHO CONST. art. III, S 2 & 4; ILL. CONST.
art. IV, 5 3; IND. CONST. art. 4, §§ 5 & 6; IOWA CONST. art. III, §§ 34-36; KAN. CONST. art. 10, § 1;
Ky. CONST. § 33; LA. CONST. art. III, § 6; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1 5§ 2 & 3, art. IV, pt. 3 § l-A,
art. IV, pt. 2 5 3; Mo. CONST. art. III, SS2-5; MASS. CONST. amend, art. CI, §5 1 & 2; MICH.
CONST. art. 4, 6; MINN. CONST. art. IV, S 3; MIss. CONST. art. 13, S 254; Mo. CONST.art.IiI, 5§ 2,
7, 10 & 45; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5; NEv. CONST. art. 4, S 5; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, arts. 9, 9a & 26; N.J. CONST. art. IV, 5 3, 1; N.M. CONST. art. IV, 5 3; N.Y. CONST.
art. III, 5§ 4 & 5; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3 & 5; OHIO CONST. art. XI, S 21; OKLA. CONST. art. V,
§ IA; ORE. CONST. art. IV, 56; PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 & 17; R.I. CONST. amend. XIII, 5 1 &
amend. XIX, 5 1; S.C. CONST. art. III, S 3; S.D. C9NST. art. III, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. 4, 54-6;
TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-28; UTAH CONST. art. IX, 5§ 2-4; VT. CONST. ch. II, SS 13, 18 & 73; VA.
CONST. art. II, 5 6; WASH. CONST. art. II, 55 2 & 3; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1-10; Wis. CONST.
art. IV, 5 3 & art. XIV, 5 12; WYOM. CONST. art. 3, 5§ 48-50 & art. III, § 3.
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supplements the constitutional delegation. 19 1 Generally, the
responsibility to reapportion has been conferred on one of three
authorities. In two states, Alaska and Maryland, the Governor is
responsible for drafting an apportionment plan; 192 in thirty-six
states the legislature is responsible; 193 and in eleven states special
apportionment commissions are established to reapportion the
state. 194

Currently, North Dakota appears to be the only state in which
the status of the apportionment law is unclear. 195 In part this is due
to the fact that North Dakota may have neither a statutory nor a
96
constitutional law dealing with apportionment. 1
B.

REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSIONS

In view of North Dakota's apparent lack of delegation of
apportionment authority, 97 and the North Dakota Legislature's
difficulties in formulating plans that will survive constitutional
challenges, 198 the state should consider the creation of a
reapportionment commission as a possible solution to its recurring
apportionment problems. At present, eleven states have
commissions, which are primarily responsible for designing
apportionment plans. 199 The creation of a commission may
eliminate the conflict of interest that frequently exists in state
reapportionment procedures.2 0 0 Additionally, a commission may
improve state legislative processes by eliminating the need for the
legislature to deal directly with the time-consuming function of
apportioning the state. 2 0 ' Finally, a plan developed by a
191. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, SS 801-08 (1979); FLA. STAT. S 10.001-06 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII
REV. STAT. SS 25-1 to -7 (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. SS 3-3-2-1, -2 (Burns 1972); IowA CODE

ANN. SS 42.1-.7 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 4.11, .15 (1981); MONT. CODE
ANN. 55 5-1-101 to-110 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 2-7-2; -8-2; -8- (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
SS 1901-1909 (Supp. 1981).
192. See supra note 190.
193. Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See supra notes 190 & 191.
194. Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont. See supra notes 190 & 191.
195. Id.
196. In North Dakota no valid statutory or constitutional provision delegating the authority to
apportion exists. See discussion of history of apportionment in North Dakota, supra notes 55-188.
197. See supra notes 98 & 196 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 55-189 and accompanying text.
199. The states are Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. See supra note 190.
200. For general discussion of apportionment commissions and a Model Reapportionment Act
that uses a commission, see Adams, A Model Statute Reapportionment Process, supra note 40, at 854.
201. Id. at 855.

474

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

nonpartisan commission may be viewed as being fair to all
0 2
concerned, thereby minimizing troublesome litigation. 2
Membership on apportionment commissions varies from state
to state. 203 Generally, the power over appointment to the
20 4
commission is granted to the members of the political parties,
although in Arkansas the members are specifically designated. 20 5 In
Montana and Pennsylvania the majority and minority leaders of
both houses each select one member, and those four members
jointly select the fifth member. 20 6 In Colorado the chief justice of
the state supreme court selects four members of the commission,
the legislative department appoints four members, and the
executive department appoints three. 20 7 In Vermont the chief
justice appoints the special master of the commission, and the
Governor appoints the citizen members, 208 while in Missouri the
lists
Governor selects the members of the commission from
09
2
parties.
political
major
two
the
by
her
or
him
to
submitted
In several states the apportionment law specifically forbids the
commission members to have political or governmental
affiliations. 2 10 Further, in three states the members are chosen from
21
specific regions of the state. 1
202. Id. at 857.
203. For example, in Arkansas the board consists of the Governor, the secretary of state, and the
attorney general. ARK. CONST. amend. 45, S 1. In Maine the state constitution provides that the
commission shall consist of thirteen members. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, S 1-A.
204. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, S 1-A; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 6; HAWAII REv. STAT. S 25-2
(1979); N.J. CONST. art. IV, S 3 1; and OHIO CONST. art. XI, 5 1.
205. For members of Arkansas commission, see supra note 203.
206. See MONT. CONST. art, V, S 14 and PA. CONST. art. 11, § 17.
207. Article five, section 48(1) (a) of the Colorado Constitution states the following:
After each federal census of the United States, the senatorial districts and
representative districts shall be established, revised, or altered, and the members of
the senate and the house of representatives apportioned among them, by a Colorado
reapportionment conimission consisting of eleven members, to be appointed and
having the qualifications as prescribed in this section. Of such members, four shall be
appointed by the legislative department, three by the executive department, and four
by the judicial department of the state.
COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 48(l)(a).
208. Section 1904(a) of title 17 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated begins as follows: "There is
hereby created the legislative apportionment board, consisting of a special master designated by the
chiefjustice of the supreme court. . . . " VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 5 1904(a)(1968).
209. Mo. CONST. art. Ill. § 2.
210. Section six of article four of the Constitution of Michigan states, in part, as follows:
No office or employees of the federal, state or local governments, excepting
notaries public or members of the armed forces reserve, shall be eligible for
membership on the commission. Members of the commission shall not be eligible for
election to the legislature until two years after the apportionment in which they
participated becomes effective.
MICH. CONST. art. 4, S 6. See also MONT. CODE ANN. 5 5-1-105 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, S 1904
(1968).
211. See MONT. CoDE ANN. § 5-1-102 (1981); MICH. CONST. art. 4, S 6; COLO. CONST. art. V, S
48 (1) (c).
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The basic duty of the commission is to apportion the state. In
fulfilling that duty the commission must ensure that both the public
and the legislature are aware of its actions. Thus, most states
require public hearings and publication of the proposed
12
apportionment plan.
Subsequent to the initial publication and public hearings, the
commissions are required to review comments or criticisms, and
make any necessary corrections. 213 A plan is then adopted and filed
by the commission. In two states the plans are submitted to the
legislature for approval. 214 One state requires that the plan be
submitted to its supreme court for review. 21 5 In any event, if the
plan is not challenged, after a specified period of time the plan
becomes final. 21 6 Most states grant the state supreme court original
21 7
jurisdiction to review the plan.
As an alternative to apportionment by the legislature, North
Dakota should consider the formation of a reapportionment
commission. A model reapportionment process 2 1 8 utilizing various
212. See e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1979); MICH. CONST. art.
4, 5 6; MONT. CODE ANN. S 5-1-108 (1981); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, S 1-A; OHIO CONsT. art. XI,
51.
213. For example, the Hawaian statute provides, in pertinent part:
At least one public hearing on the proposed reapportionment plan shall be held in each
basic island unit-after initial publication of the plan. At least twenty days' notice shall
be given of such public hearing. The notice shall include a statement of the substance
of the proposed reapportionment plan, and of the date, time and place where
interested persons may be heard thereon. The notice shall be published at least once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the basic island unit where the hearing will be
held. All interested persons shall be afforded an opportunity to submit data, views, or
arguments, orally or in writing, for consideration by the commission. After the last of
such public hearings, but in no event later than one hundred fifty days from the date
on which all members of the commission are certified, the commission shall determine
whether or not the plan is in need of correction or modification, make the correction or
modification, if any, and file with the chief election officer, a final legislative
reapportionment plan. Within ten days after filing of the final reapportionment plan,
the chief election officer shall cause to be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the State, the final legislative reapportionment plan which shall, upon
publication, become effective as of the date of filing and govern the election of
members of the next five succeeding legislatures.
HAWAII

REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1979).

214. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A; MONT. CODE ANN. 5-1-110 (1981). In Montana the
commission submits its "plan to the legislature by the 10th day of the first regular session after its
appointment or after the census figures are available." MONT. CooE ANN. 5-1-109 (1981).
215. See CoLO. CONST. art. V, § 48.
216. In Michigan the plan becomes final 60 days after publication, provided the plan is not
challenged. MICH. CONST. art 4, S 6. In Hawaii the plan becomes final effective the date of filing.
HAWAII REV. STAT. S 25-2 (1979); and in Arkansas an apportionment plan becomes final 30 days
from the filing date. ARK. CONST. amend. 45, S 4.
217. See MICH. CONST. art4, S6.
218. The model proposal includes both a Model State Act and a Model Constitutional
Amendment. Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process, supra note 40, at 851. The amendment
establishes a reapportionment commission, sets out the criteria to be used by the commission in the

development of a plan, and provides forjudicial review. Id. at 852. The Model Act implements the
amendment, defines the reapportionment criteria, and establishes the duties, powers, and method of
appointment of the commission. Id.
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aspects of existing state procedures, 21 9 has been suggested. The
Model Act provides for the establishment of a five-member,
nonpartisan commission 220 whose duty it would be to develop a
reapportionment plan. 22t The state supreme court would have
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the plan proposed by the
22 2
commission.
The establishment of a reapportionment commission is not a
new idea in North Dakota. In 1973 the voters in North Dakota
disapproved, by a vote of 43,178 to 53,831, an initiated
constitutional amendment that would have established a legislative
districting commission to apportion the state. 223 The commission
would have been composed of nine members.2 24 The majority and
minority leaders of each House would have designated two
members, and these eight commissioners would have selected a
ninth. 225 None of the commissioners would have been legislators,
and the North Dakota Supreme Court would have had the
2 26
authority to review the commission's plan and to order changes.
All attempts to apportion North Dakota since 1973 have been
unsuccessful. 227 These attempts have included the following: An
unconstitutional senate bill; 228 the defeat on the November 1980
general election ballot of a resolution to repeal a portion of the
North Dakota Constitution and to adopt new apportionment
219. Currently, in Montana and Pennsylvania the majority and minority leaders of both houses
select one member to the commission, and these four select a fifth member. See supra note 206.
Michigan, Montana, and Vermont forbid political or governmental affiliations on the part of the
commission members. See supra note 210. Public hearings regarding the proposed apportionment
plan are currently required under the laws of Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, Maine, and
Ohio. See supra note 212. Review of the commission's plan is placed in the state supreme court in
most states. See supra note 217.
220. Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process, supra note 40, at 867. Section (b) of the
Model Constitutional Amendment states the following:
In each year ending in zero and at any other time of court ordered reapportionment, a
commission shall be established to prepare a reapportionment plan for state legislative
and congressional districts. The commission shall consist of five members, none of
whom may be public officials. The president of the senate, the speaker of the house,
the minority leader of the senate, and the minority leader of the house shall each select
one member. The four members so selected shall select, by a vote of at least three
members, a fifth member who shall serve as the chair. The legislature shall establish
by law qualifications of commissioners and procedures for their selection and the
filling of vacancies. The legislature shall establish by law the duties and powers of the
commission and shall appropriate funds to enable the commission to carry out its
duties.
Id.
221.
222.
223.
measure,
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Adams A Model State Reapportionment Process, supra note 40, at 880.
1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 607. The amendment was disapproved, along with a referred
during a special election held on December 4, 1973. Id.; 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 602.
1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 607.
Id.
Id.
See supranotes 144-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
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provisions instead; 229 the occurrence of the 1980 federal census;
and the anticipated challenge to the Chapman (1975) court-ordered
plan. 230 It appears, therefore, that it is again time for North Dakota
to consider adoption of a nonpartisan reapportionment
23 1
commission, such as that proposed by the Model Act.
It is clear that many benefits may be achieved by the creation
of a properly appointed, nonpartisan apportionment commission.
By granting the commission authority to study, prepare, propose,
hold hearings, ultimately adopt and file a plan, which may be.
subject to some type of judicial review, the legislature could avoid
the many problems inherent in adopting apportionment plans. It
should also be evident that the legislature should not attempt to
devise a constitutional amendment or statute that would require
the legislature to approve the plan. Such a measure would defeat
the purpose of the apportionment commission, i.e., taking the
burdensome task of apportioning the state from the legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the reapportionment of North Dakota
continued as the 1981 legislative assembly concluded its regular
session. As has happened in the past, the legislature did not
reapportion the state during the regular session.2 32 It is anticipated
that the legislature will meet in a special session late in 1981 to
233
reapportion the state.
Among the usual political difficulties inherent
to
reapportionment, the 1981 legislature may be faced not only with
the problem of seeing that a constitutional plan is adopted but also
with the problem of determining who should draft the plan and how
the plan should be approved. 234 It is suggested that the legislature
consider the alternative of having a nonpartisan committee perform
the task of apportioning. In doing so, the legislature may save the
state the expense of more litigation while at the same time leaving
itself free to deal with other matters.
In the event the legislature decides to do the reapportioning
itself, legislators should remember that apportioning a state must
not result in a conflict between rural and urban interests or
229. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
232. 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 720.
233. Id.
234. Currently, North Dakota is probably the only state in the United States that does not have
any express law governing the apportionment process. See supra notes 182-96 and
accompanying text.
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Republicans against Democrats. As stated by one writer, "Reapportionment should not be thought of in terms of a conflict of
interests . . . . In the long run, the interests of all in an equitable
system of representation that will strengthen state government is far
more important than any temporary advantage to an area enjoying
overrepresentation. "235 The accuracy of this statement is
exemplified by the extensive litigation to which North Dakota has
been subjected in the area of apportionment. To avoid further
judicial intervention, the legislature will have to develop an
approach to apportionment that ensures fair and equal
representation to all voters.

SANDRA L. TABOR

235. Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, A Report to the President for Transmittal to the
Congress, 39-40 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955).

